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Abstract 
In this paper, we investigate the role of security officers, the police and armed service 
personnel in dampening the effect of terrorism externalities on tourist arrivals. The temporal 
and geographic scopes are respectively 2010-2015 and 163 countries. Four terrorism 
measurements are used. They include the number of: incidents, injuries, fatalities and property 
damages. The main findings indicate that armed service personnel can effectively be used to 
modulate the damaging influence of all four terrorism externalities in order to achieve a 
positive net effect on tourist arrivals. Conversely, the corresponding moderating role of 
security officers and the police is not statistically significant. Moreover, violent 
demonstrations and homicides have a harmful effect on tourist arrivals while the number of 
incarcerations displays the opposite effect. Policy implications are discussed.  
 
JEL Classification: D74; Z32; Z38  
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1. Introduction 
 The positioning of this study builds on three main tendencies in academic and policy-
making circles. They are: (i) the growing challenge of terrorism across the world, (ii) the 
policy relevance of tackling the consequences of terrorist attacks on economic development 
outcomes and (iii) gaps in the tourism literature. 
 First, with respect to the evolving challenge of terrorism, in recent decades, the 
phenomena of terrorism has been on the rise across the globe. The burgeoning phenomenon 
has partly been fueled by the 2011 Arab Spring and corresponding negative externalities 
(GTI, 2014; Asongu et al., 2018a). 
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 Second, the policy importance of addressing the negative externalities associated with 
terrorism fundamentally builds on corresponding costs and consequences. On the one hand, 
terrorists’ activities inflict substantial adverse consequences on economic development 
outcomes. On the other, the cost of fighting terrorism is relevant to policy because the 
alternative investments forgone could be spent within the framework of socio-economic 
investments that are imperative for the achievement of sustainable development goals in the 
post-2015 development agenda.   
 Third, the literature on tourism has largely focused on the determinants of tourism 
without investigating how the destructive influence of such violent activities could effectively 
be mitigated with policy variables (Saha & Yap, 2013; Alvarez & Campo, 2014; Mehmood et 
al., 2016). This study departs from this existing literature by focusing on how the adverse 
consequences of policy syndromes (such as terrorism externalities) on tourism could be 
effectively modulated with policy variables (in terms of the forces of law and order).  Four 
policy syndromes in terms of terrorist outcomes are selected, involving the number of:  
incidents, injuries, fatalities, and property damages. In addition, the modulating impact of two 
main policy variables are investigated, namely (i) security officers and the police and (ii) 
armed service personnel. Hence, there is an underpinning assumption that good governance 
practices embodied within the framework of the forces of law and order helps to lessen the 
potentially adverse consequences of terrorism. Therefore, the research question which the 
study aims to answer is: “can the forces of law and order effectively modulate the effect of 
terrorism externalities on tourist arrivals across the world?” 
The closest strand of the literature to the present study has focused on using foreign 
aid policy to limit the consequences of terrorism on macroeconomic variables 
(Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017). We deviate from this stream of 
literature by focusing on internal policies and the tourism sector. 
 
2. Data and methodology 
The study focuses on a sample of 163 countries using data for the period 2010 to 2015. The 
data is obtained from a plethora of sources disclosed in T able 1. The choice of geographical 
and temporal scopes of the study is contingent on data availability constraints. This 
justification is in accordance with recent literature that has used the same dataset (Asongu, 
2018; Asongu & Acha-Anyi, 2018). 
 The dependent variable is the number of tourist arrivals. The insecurity variables or 
policy syndromes are captured with four main terrorism externalities, namely the number of: 
4 
 
incidents, injuries, fatalities and property damages. The modulating policy variables are the 
forces of law and order comprising: (i) security officers and the police and (ii) armed service 
personnel. The selection of these policy syndromes and policy variables is motivated by the 
literature on the determinants of violence, crimes, terrorism and tourism (see Freytag et al., 
2011; GPI, 2016; Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2016, 2017; Asongu et al., 2018). The adopted 
control variables include: homicide, violent demonstrations and incarcerations1. These 
indicators are consistent with the extant studies on tourist arrivals (Saha & Yap, 2013; 
Alvarez & Campo, 2014; Mehmood et al., 2016). The first-two variables (i.e. homicide and 
violent demonstrations) are anticipated to negatively influence tourist arrivals while the third 
(i.e. incarcerations) is expected to positively affect tourism. This is essentially because the 
first-two increase perceived risk to life in the destination country whereas the third reduces 
the perceived risk.  
 
Table 1: Definition of variables 
  
Variables  Definitions of variables and sources  
  
Tourism  The number of tourists arrivals  
  
Security Officers & Police Number of internal security officers and police 
per 100,000 people UNODC; EIU estimates 
  
Armed Services Personnel Number of armed services personnel per 100,000 people 
The Military Balance, IISS 
  
Terrorism incidents  Logarithm (1+ base) of  Total number of terrorist incidents in a given year. 
  
Terrorism fatalities  Logarithm (1+ base) of  Total number of fatalities caused by terrorists in a given 
year 
  
Terrorism injuries  Logarithm (1+ base) of  Total number of injuries caused by terrorists in a given 
year 
  
Terrorism-related property 
damages  
Logarithm (1+ base) of the measure of the total property damage from terrorist 
incidents in a given year. 
  
Homicides  Number of homicides per 100,000 people 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Surveys on Crime Trends 
and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (CTS); EIU estimates 
  
Incarceration  Number of jailed population per 100,000 people 
World Prison Brief, International Centre for Prison Studies, University of Essex 
  
Violent demonstrations  Likelihood of violent demonstrations 
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts 
  
  
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP).The  Economic 
Intelligence Unit (EIU). United Nations Peacekeeping Funding (UNPKF). GDP: Gross Domestic Product. The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). 
 
Table 1 provides the definitions and sources of variables.  We note that the summary 
statistics of the selected variables indicate that standard deviation of the dependent variable is 
much higher than the mean. Such evidence of over-dispersion of data on the outcome variable 
                                                          
1
 By incarcerations, the study refers to all types of lawful convictions (i.e. those related to terrorist activity as 
well as those related to drug, petty thefts, inter alia). 
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suggests that a Negative Binomial model is a more appropriate estimation technique. 
Consistent with Choi and Luo (2013) and Choi (2015), a Negative Binomial regression is 
used because the data is positively skewed. Moreover, in line with recent literature, the 
independent variables are lagged by one year in order to  correct for potential endogeneity 
(Mlachila et al., 2017). Owing to lack of space, the summary statistics, correlation matrix and 
model specification are available upon request.  
 
3. Empirical results 
 This section presents and discusses the empirical findings. Whereas Table 2 shows 
findings pertaining to security officers and the police, those in Table 3 relate to armed service 
personnel.  
Table 2: Negative binomial regressions with security officers and police 
         
 Dependent variable: Number of Tourist Arrivals  
  
 Without control variables With control variables 
   
Constant  15.606*** 15.755*** 15.641*** 15.553*** 16.778*** 16.633*** 16.715*** 16.774*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Security Officers & Police(SOP)(-1) -0.099 -0.0262 -0.028 -0.034 -0.087 0.003 -0.020 -0.017 
 (0.368) (0.812) (0.802) (0.479) (0.352) (0.971) (0.828) (0.840) 
Terrorism incidents(-1) 0.080 --- --- --- 0.073 --- --- --- 
 (0.613)    (0.550)    
Terrorism fatalities(-1) --- -0.114 --- --- --- 0.665 --- --- 
  (0.389)    (0.048)   
Terrorism injuries(-1) --- --- 0.029 --- --- --- 0.074 --- 
   (0.806)    (0.452)  
Terrorism-related property damages(-1) --- --- --- 0.132 --- --- --- 0.123 
    (0.500)    (0.482) 
Terrorism incidents×SOP(-1) 0.077 --- --- --- 0.082* --- --- --- 
 (0.170)    (0.066)    
Terrorism fatalities×SOP(-1) --- 0.065 --- --- --- 0.038 --- --- 
  (0.154)    (0.333)   
Terrorism injuries×SOP(-1) --- --- 0.039 --- --- --- 0.035 --- 
   (0.346)    (0.303)  
Terrorism-related property 
damages×SOP(-1) 
--- --- --- 0.064 --- --- --- 0.075 
    (0.345)    (0.170) 
Homicides(-1) --- --- --- --- -0.508*** -0.583*** -0.556*** -0.523*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Incarceration(-1) --- --- --- --- 0.641*** 0.688*** 0.664*** 0.645*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Violent demonstrations(-1) --- --- --- --- -0.463*** -0.390*** -0.421*** -0.454*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Armed Services Personnel(-1) --- --- --- --- -0.137 -0.101 -0.118 -0.177* 
     (0.187) (0.355) (0.274) (0.090) 
        
 
Net Effects na na na na na na na na 
        
 
Log likelihood  -9569.354 -9593.458 -9586.805 -9576.902 -9443.501 -9470.4   -9462.947 -9451.660 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) Chi-Square  54.99*** 6.78* 20.09*** 39.89*** 306.70*** 252.90*** 267.80*** 290.38*** 
Alpha 1.853*** 1.962*** 1.932*** 1.887*** 1.361*** 1.456*** 1.429*** 1.389*** 
Observations  580 580 580 580 580 580 580 580 
         
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Mean value of Security Officers & Police: 2.728. Min and Maximum values 
of  Security Officers & Police are respectively 1.081 and 5.000. na: not applicable due to the insignificance of  unconditional effects of 
insecurity variables and/or conditional effect from the interaction between the security policy variable and insecurity variables.  
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In both tables, the first panel is concerned with estimations that do not involve controls 
variables, while the second panel includes a conditioning information set. In order to examine 
the importance of forces of law and order in reducing the potential adverse impact of 
terrorism externalities on tourism, corresponding net effects are computed in conformity with 
arguments in recent literature (Tchamyou, 2018). 
 
Table 3: Negative binomial regressions with armed service personnel 
         
 Dependent variable: Number of Tourist Arrivals  
  
 Without control variables With control variables 
   
Constant  14.655*** 15.289*** 14.953*** 14.932*** 16.165*** 16.338*** 16.305*** 16.343*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Armed Services Personnel (ASP) (-1) 0.411** 0.241 0.376** 0.318** 0.020 -0.037 0.00008 -0.058 
 (0.013) (0.133) (0.024) (0.043) (0.876) (0.760) (1.000) (0.638) 
Terrorism incidents(-1) 0.659*** --- --- --- 0.454*** --- --- --- 
 (0.000)    (0.000)    
Terrorism fatalities(-1) --- 0.138 --- --- --- 0.217** --- --- 
  (0.379)    (0.012)   
Terrorism injuries(-1) --- --- 0.397*** --- --- --- 0.279*** --- 
   (0.000)    (0.000)  
Terrorism-related property damages(-1) --- --- --- 0.707*** --- --- --- 0.497*** 
    (0.000)    (0.000) 
Terrorism incidents×ASP(-1) -0.209*** --- --- --- -0.088* --- --- --- 
 (0.002)    (0.069)    
Terrorism fatalities×ASP(-1) --- -0.039 --- --- --- -0.039 --- --- 
  (0.662)    (0.399)   
Terrorism injuries×ASP(-1) --- --- -0.150** --- --- --- -0.061 --- 
   (0.014)    (0.121)  
Terrorism-related property 
damages×ASP(-1) 
--- --- --- -0.220*** --- --- --- -0.091 
    (0.005)    (0.104) 
Homicides(-1) --- --- --- --- -0.498*** -0.577*** -0.545*** -0.514*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Incarceration(-1) --- --- --- --- 0.641*** 0.697*** 0.667*** 0.643*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Violent demonstrations(-1) --- --- --- --- -0.459*** -0.392*** -0.422*** -0.451*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Security Officers & Police (-1) --- --- --- --- 0.029 0.063 0.048 0.058 
     (0.701) (0.436) (0.547) (0.454) 
         
Net effects 0.314 na 0.149 0.344 0.308 na na na 
         
Log likelihood  -9565.688 -9593.480 -9584.007 -9573.867 -9443.793 -9470.558 -9462.457 -9451.469 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) Chi-Square  62.32*** 6.74* 25.68*** 45.96*** 306.11*** 252.58*** 268.78*** 290.76*** 
Alpha 1.837*** 1.962*** 1.919*** 1.873*** 1.362*** 1.456*** 1.427*** 1.388*** 
Observations  580 580 580 580 580 580 580 580 
         
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Armed S. Personnel: Armed Service Personnel. Mean value of Armed Service 
Personnel: 1.648. Min and Maximum values of Armed Service Personnel are respectively 1.000 and 5.000. na: not applicable due to the 
insignificance of  unconditional effects of insecurity variables and/or conditional effect from the interaction between the security policy 
variable and insecurity variables.  
 
 
Given the above emphasis, in the second column of Table 3, the net effect from the role of 
armed service personnel in modulating the possible adverse effects of terrorism incidences is 
0.314 ([-0.209× 1.648] + [0.659]), where: 0.659 is the unconditional effect from terrorist 
events; 1.648 is the mean value of armed service personneland -0.209 is the conditional effect 
from the interaction between terrorist attacks and armed service personnel. It is important to 
note that the effects (unconditional and conditional) should be interpreted from a holistic 
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perspective in order to comprehensively assess the role of armed service personnel in  
controlling the possible damaging effects of terrorist incidences on tourist arrivals.  
 In the light of above computational insights, in Table 2, we may infer that security 
officers and police do not significantly affect terrorism outcomes in their relationship with 
tourist arrivals. This is presumably because net effects are not applicable due to consistently 
insignificant conditional and unconditional effects. Conversely, in Table 3 pertaining to armed 
service personnel, positive net effects are largely apparent in the relationship between tourist 
arrivals and three out of our four selected terrorism externalities, notably the number of: 
incidents, injuries and property damages. Net effects cannot be computed for the 
interconnections with terrorism fatalities for the same reason as in Table 2. 
 The significant control variables have the expected signs. Accordingly, in both tables, 
violent demonstrations and homicides have a negative effect on tourist arrivals while the 
number of incarcerations displays the opposite effect. 
 
4. Concluding implications and future research directions 
 
In this paper, we investigated the role of security officers, the police and armed service 
personnel in dampening the effect of terrorism externalities on tourist arrivals. From the 
findings it is obvious that the fight against the possible destructive influence of terrorist 
attacks on development outcomes is beyond the scope of internal security officers and the 
police. In other words, security officers and the police by themselves are necessary but not 
sufficient to mitigate the adverse consequences of terrorism. It is important to note that the 
police and security officers within the context of the study represent personnel in public 
agencies whose principal functions are the prevention, detection and investigation of crime 
and the apprehension of alleged offenders. Conversely, armed service personnel entail all 
service men and women on full-time duty in the army, navy, air force and joint forces 
(including conscripts and long-term assignments from the reserves). Thus, our results 
effectively capture the relevance of a military dimension in the fight against terrorism. To this 
end, assessing how military expenditure influences the harmful development externalities of 
terrorism is a worthwhile future research direction.   
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